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Comparative Law
1. Term and Purpose
Comparative Law describes the comparison of various laws; it is not a distinct
body of law. This is clearer from the term in German (Rechtsvergleichung) than
from the term in other languages (comparative law, droit comparé). Macrocomparison is concerned with entire legal systems; micro-comparison deals with
specific institutions or specific problems. Comparative Law thus goes beyond the
mere study of foreign legal systems. However, the difference should not be
exaggerated. First, adequate knowledge of foreign law is an indispensible
prerequisite of every legal comparison. Second, even „mere― knowledge of
foreign law necessarily contains a comparative element, if only because the
comparatist regularly looks at another legal system from (and often for) the
perspective of her own particular legal system. Foreign law is thus regularly
understood and explained automatically in relationship to one’s own law.
The actual comparison of legal systems – the discovery, explanation and
evaluation of similarities and differences – is only one of several themes of the
contemporary discipline of Comparative Law. A second theme concerns the
influence between legal systems, especially the → reception of law, whether of
individual legal institutions or of entire legal systems. With regard to Europe, this
encompasses on the one hand the influence on European private law of different
legal systems (Roman law, the law of member states, the law of non-European
states). On the other hand, it includes the transmission of European law to nonEuropean legal systems. A third theme of Comparative Law is the development of
a general theory of law. Here, comparative law functions as the discipline which
attempts to understand the various legal systems in their totality and in their
relationship to each other, without necessarily trying to avoid or minimise the
existing differences between them. This theme was prominent in the early 20th
century and is once again gaining attention today.
Different purposes are ascribed to Comparative Law: it should inform national
lawmaking, assist judges in the resolution of difficult questions, provide a basis
for legal unification or harmonisation, or simply increase knowledge and extend
awareness, especially in legal education. All these are purposes that legal science
should fulfil in general. From this perspective, Comparative Law is just a special
form of general legal science, or, phrased inversely, the comprehensive study of
law (and, with limits, legal practice) must contain a comparative component.
2. Methods
In recent times there has been increased debate about the methods and theories
of Comparative Law. No consensus has emerged, and the discussion has not yet
exercised substantial influence on practical legal comparison. Beyond mere
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doctrinal comparison, there are fundamentally two different methods, functional
and cultural legal comparison.
Functional comparison, popularised above all by Konrad Zweigert and Hein
Kötz, starts from the premise that the function of law lies in responding to social
problems and that all societies face in essence the same problems. This makes it
possible to compare legal institutions, even if they display different doctrinal
structures, as long as they fulfil the same function, because in this case they are
functionally equivalent. For example, the → common law institution of
→ consideration can be compared with the → formal requirements of German
law, insofar as both fulfil the same function: as caution against the rushed
formation of contracts and as → indicia of seriousness regarding a contractual
promise. Understanding legal norms as responses to problems supposedly also
makes it possible to designate which law is better and, on this basis, to reform
domestic law or to create an international uniform law.
Cultural comparison in contrast (sometimes called comparative legal studies or
comparative legal cultures) rejects the reduction of law to its function and instead
understands national law as an expression and development of the general culture
of a society (→ legal culture). The focus here lies on the mentality expressed in a
legal system, which is not fully observable by outsiders and can only be fully
experienced by participants of the legal system. Because cultural differences
(particularly those between civil and common law) are seen as unbridgeable and
because different legal cultures are deemed worthy of protection, cultural
comparison usually opposes comparative evaluation and legal unification as both
impossible and undesirable. Instead, it promotes tolerance for foreign law and for
difference in general.
The discrepancies between the approaches are smaller than the sometimes
fierce debate suggests. Both approaches reject a limitation of comparative law to
the analysis of black letter law; instead, both search for the role of law in society.
Both approaches value and accept the differences between legal systems. Properly
understood, functional comparison does not, as is often claimed, fail to recognise
or accept the identity of different legal systems. The focus on functional
equivalence enables functional comparison to grasp simultaneously the
similarities in the solutions and the differences in the ways of reaching these
solutions. These differences in approaches can meaningfully be described as legal
culture. Recently, this insight has been used in the attempt to bring legal culture
and functional equivalence together under the concept of legal paradigms.
Paradigm describes the manner in which legal systems address problems in
specific (cultural) ways to attain (functionally equivalent) solutions.
3. Development
Comparative Law in the broad sense is as old as law itself. In a narrower sense,
Comparative Law became possible only when different legal systems were
distinguished, especially with the rise of the state monopoly on lawmaking. As
long as European monarchs refrained from legislating in private law, private law
doctrine and practice did not adopt an explicitly comparative method; instead,
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legal reasoning took place with common parameters derived from the → ius
commune, → the → lex mercatoria or → natural law. Here, the frequent
invocation of foreign authorities (also by English courts) did not amount to
comparison of different legal systems; rather, those authorities were considered
sources of a common law.
Since the beginning of the 19th century, when private law in continental
Europe was nationalised by way of → codification, modern European
comparative law has developed. Comparative law journals were established, and
comparative law societies were founded—often on a national basis, since the main
purpose of Comparative law was for a long time to provide inspiration for state
legislation. At the same time, comparative law experienced a double-limitation,
which largely continues until today. First, it was generally concentrated on
Europe. The law in former colonies (with the exception of the United States) was
not seen as sufficiently independent and was largely ignored. Non-European legal
systems that had not been supplanted by European law, especially in Asia, Africa
and in the Pacific, were excluded from comparative law and were relegated to the
newly developed field of legal ethnology. Second, comparative law largely
concentrated on private law, which was viewed as apolitical and therefore
appeared to be the only area of law fit for strict, scientific legal comparison.
Comparative law was long focused on the comparison of legislative texts,
especially between continental European legal systems, which were divided into
different → legal families, in particular depending on their French or German
origin. The English common law, which was uncodified and traditionally
characterised by a more prominent role for case law and inductive methods,
presented a considerable challenge for this législation comparée, as it is called in
French.
Since the first Comparative Law World Congress in Paris in 1900 (which is
somewhat arbitrarily viewed as the birth of modern comparative law), academic
comparative law has made progress. Comparative law now goes beyond analysis
of the texts of legal rules and instead compares the law in action; this makes it
easier to compare civil and common law. At the same time, comparative law was
aimed at the formulation of a common supranational law – if not at the global
level, at least at the European level. In the 20th century, international working
groups have been constituted that push forward unification, whether on a political
or academic basis. However, the double-limitation of the 19th Century – a
limitation on Europe and on a presumably apolitical private law – continued. The
emphasis on apolitical law is the only way to explain why it was so controversial
whether socialist law could meaningfully be compared to capitalist law. Also, the
concept of private law in comparative law remained trapped in 19th century
conceptions . The changed understanding of private law in the 20th century
(constitutionalisation, materialisation, private law as a tool of regulation) is still
often either ignored or seen as a corruption of private law. This is one reason why
the apolitical private law of classical comparative law and the regulatory private
law understanding of the EU still remain somewhat unconnected.
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4. European Private Law Studies
European private law studies arose out of comparative law but have now
transcended it. After the Second World War the first calls were made for a
European-wide private law based on comparative law. Such calls have become
stronger since the beginning of the 1990s. The aim had been to develop a unified
European private law, based either on the similarities discovered through
functional comparative law or on the old or a newly developed ius commune.
Recently, more attention is being paid to the comparison among European laws in
legal education and doctrine. Comparative law textbooks on European private
law, some as casebooks with primary texts from the relevant legal systems,
provide students with access to information on other legal systems. Even books on
doctrinal questions in domestic law now regularly contain a comparative law part;
explicit comparative law projects are valued more highly than previously. Finally,
international cooperation has also increased (in part due to EU subsidies). Several
new journals on comparative and European private law now exist. Above all
various international working groups with different goals and methods are
working towards a European private law on an explicitly comparative basis.
Among the various projects, comparative law plays the greatest role for the
Common Core Project. This project is compiling the similarities and differences
between European legal systems using detailed comparative law case studies,
largely without evaluation of these solutions. Other groups connect comparative
law surveys with normative searches for the best solution (→ Restatements). This
is the case for the ―Lando ―Commission on European Contract Law (→ Principles
of European Contract Law) and the → Study Group on a European Civil Code,
which emerged from it, as well as the European Group on Tort Law (→ Principles
of European Tort Law). Many EU projects have a more regulatory understanding
of private law, whether they emphasise market-liberal or retributive-social private
law, so the comparison of the usually less regulated private law of the EU member
states is often less important. Altogether, comparative law is now only one of
many elements of European private law; on its own it is insufficient both as a
foundation and as a basis of legitimacy.
A similar development occurred among opponents of the Europeanisation of
private law jurisprudence. For a long time comparative lawyers were almost
unanimous in their support of a Europeanised private law; resistance came from
scholars of domestic law. Now, some comparative lawyers also invoke a
necessarily domestic legal culture against a Europeanised private law; others
support a Europe-wide debate but not necessarily a unification of European
private law. All of this means that the seemingly inextricable tie between
comparative law and legal unification has been resolved, with liberating effect for
both comparative law and the legal unification debate.
Most arguments on whether and how differences among legal systems can and
should be overcome must be found outside comparative law. This means that
comparative law is necessary but not sufficient for the development of European
private law. The focus of European private law is not merely on the understanding
and evaluation of differences between legal systems but also on ways to deal with
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these differences. Moreover, European private law must understand the role of
law in society, but it must first and foremost develop legal rules and a European
legal doctrine.
5. European Law-Making
Comparative law work is important to European Union institutions for several
reasons. The basic question of whether the EU should and is permitted to act
regularly contains a comparative law component. The questions of whether legal
differences create obstacles to the → internal market and whether national law is
insufficient according to the → subsidiarity principle cannot really be answered
without comparative analysis of the legal systems of member states. However, the
empirical studies that would be necessary for this are only rarely carried out
comprehensively. Often the relevance to the internal market and the need to take
action on the European level are asserted without substantiation.
Once the EU decides to regulate, it depends more strongly on comparative law
preparatory work than is the case in the domestic law-making process of
individual states. When the EU decides on a new area of regulation, it regularly
lacks its own legal tradition as a point of reference, so it must reach back to the
experience of the member states or of non-European legal systems. The
promulgation of EU laws is frequently preceded by comprehensive comparative
law preparatory work, which is often elaborated internally and then, regrettably,
not published. For larger projects, the EU often entrusts researchers outside EU
institutions with such preparatory work.
Finally, comparative law is also important in the implementation phase. EU
law does not merely replace national law tout court; it interacts with it in complex
ways. As a consequence, a good comparative understanding of the member state
laws, in comparison both with each other and with EU law itself, is a prerequisite
for the successful implementation of EU law as well as for its monitoring pursuant
to Art 211 EC Treaty/17 TFEU.
6. European Adjudication
Comparative law is also important in the → European Court of Justice, even
though the Court is limited to the interpretation of EU law and does not address
the correct interpretation of the laws of member states. For instance, the question
whether the application of a member state’s laws exerts excessive burdens on the
citizens of other member states in addition to the burdens imposed on them by
their country of origin can be answered only through a comparison between the
relevant member state laws. Another use concerns the autonomous interpretation
of EU law, which excludes only the direct recourse to the law of a single member
state, not necessarily recourse to a comparison of member state laws in general.
Comparative law is incontrovertibly necessary in the establishment of general
principles of EU law. It is also used to fill gaps in EU law where the member
states’ legal systems are in agreement or at least show a common development.
However, where the EU aims at overcoming member state laws, such recourse to
comparative law is probably impossible.
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At the Court of Justice, comparative law arguments are predominantly
prepared by the Advocate General, although the comprehensiveness and quality of
these arguments differ strongly. In addition, the European Court of Justice can
also request that the parties, especially the Commission, undertake comparative
law preparatory work; such comparative insights can also be drawn from
submissions of the member state. Finally, the Court itself puts together internal
comparative law studies that remain unpublished.
The courts of member states or European courts use decisions from the courts
of other member states as precedent in the interpretation of EU law, though still
too rarely. Such use does not really amount to comparative law, since it involves a
discussion within one and the same legal system. In addition, comparative law is
sometimes used for the interpretation and development of domestic law; this can,
over time, lead to convergence of a common European private law.
7. Outlook
European private law jurisprudence is currently emancipating itself from
comparative law in the same way that European Community Law emancipated
itself from international law and national constitutional law. Now that
comparative private law between the member states has achieved a considerable
degree of knowledge, European private law can focus on other elements
necessary. If a → Common Frame of Reference or a European civil code should
be successful, it cannot be grounded merely in comparative law; it also must
persuade on other grounds. At the same time that comparative law becomes less
important, European private law can concentrate stronger on its normative
components and its connections to the EU and its law. Simultaneously, its
decreased importance within European private law should enable comparative law
in Europe to once again focus on questions other than the unification of European
private law. Once European private law has emancipated itself from comparative
law, comparative law can hopefully turn more attention to other matters like
public law and the comparison with non-European legal system, which over a
long period has notably retreated into the background.
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